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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Concluding That Aberasturi’s Detention Was
Unreasonably Extended
A.

The District Court Clearly Erred By Determining That Aberasturi’s
Detention Was Prolonged Beyond The Original Investigation, Because
Before Aberasturi Was Told To “Sit Tight” A Second Time, Officer Viens
Had Already Been Notified That The K-9 Had Alerted On Aberasturi’s
Vehicle
The primary issue on appeal is a question of timing: whether the K-9 alert

happened before, or after, the officer’s continued detention of Aberasturi with an
instruction to “sit tight.” (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-14.) Aberasturi appears to
agree with this framing of the issue, as she states that “the time of the dog alert”
is the “determining factor in this case” and the “decisive finding.” (Respondent’s
brief, pp. 12-13.) Application of the law to the evidence shows the district court’s
factual finding that the dog alert was not shown to precede the extension of the
detention is clearly erroneous.
The burden of proof “for all suppression issues” is a preponderance of the
evidence standard. See State v. Harris, 130 Idaho 444, 447, 942 P.2d 568, 571
(Ct. App. 1997). Where the district court below determines “that a party has
failed in its burden of proof,” this Court will accept those findings, so long as they
are not clearly erroneous. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Roe, 139 Idaho
18, 21, 72 P.3d 858, 861 (2003). “Under the restrained standard of clear error
customarily applied to factual issues, a factual finding will not be deemed clearly
erroneous unless, after reviewing the entire record, an appellate court is left with
a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”

Id.

Factual

“[f]indings will not be deemed clearly erroneous if they are supported by

1

substantial evidence in the record.”

State v. Lutton, No. 43257, 2017 WL

192846, at *4 (Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2017) (citing State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 98,
137 P.3d 481, 485 (Ct. App 2006)).
Here, the district court clearly erred by finding the timing of the K-9 alert
could not be determined. The record does not reveal substantial evidence that
supports the district court’s factual findings on this issue. Rather, the evidence,
found in the transcript, shows that the alert happened before the extended
detention.

Because Aberasturi’s statement of the facts omits the decisive

portions of the transcript, they are worth repeating here again. Officer Plaisted
testified that:
Q. Okay. And so what does Geno [the K-9] do at that time?
A. So he’s—he’s sat down. He’s alerted to the car. I now have
probable cause to search this car.
I open up the passenger door. He immediately flies into the car,
goes right to the center console area of the vehicle, again starts
sniffing around the center console….
Q. Okay. And so after he does that, what do you do next?
A. I pull him out of the car, I lifted up the center console, looked in,
and saw a package of Marlboro cigarettes. And I opened that
up, looked in, and I believe I saw a plastic baggie with some
white powder in it which I believed to be methamphetamine at
that point. I, then, left the car, shut the door to go put my
dog back in the car, in my patrol car, and notified Officer
Viens of the alert and specific areas that we needed to
search.
(Tr., p. 71, L. 20 – p. 73, L. 1 (emphasis added).)
Q. So when your dog alerted and you let him inside the car—
A. Right.
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Q. —and he showed interest in the center console and so then you
searched and found that, did you at this time search the entirety of
the car?
A. No, ma’am.
Q. Okay. That’s when you closed the door, put the dog back,
and then alerted Officer Viens?
A. Yes, ma’am.
(Tr., p. 73, Ls. 8-18 (emphasis added).) Officer Viens correspondingly testified
that the post-alert notification happened while he was still discussing disorderly
conduct with Aberasturi:
Q. Okay. And while you’re having this discussion with her
about the disorderly conduct violation, does Officer Plaisted
get your attention.
A. Yes.
Q. And what is that for?
A. To let me know that his dog alerted on the vehicle.
(Tr., p. 43, Ls. 18-25 (emphasis added).) Taken together, the officers’ testimony
is consistent and unmistakable: the alert occurred prior to the end of Viens’
conversation with Aberasturi, and therefore prior to the second “sit tight.”
By contrast, Aberasturi’s summary of the facts simply states that “[t]he
district court found the dog alerted after Officer Viens concluded his disorderly
conduct investigation.” (Respondent’s brief, p. 4.) However, in addition to being
1
an incorrect characterization of the district court’s finding, this statement of fact

1

The district court did not find that “the dog alerted after Officer Viens concluded
his disorderly conduct investigation.” (Respondent’s brief, p. 4; see R., pp. 12132.) As previously mentioned in the state’s briefing, the district court found that
“[whether [the officer-to-officer notification] occurred as Geno was showing
3

lacks any citation to the transcript that would support it. (See Respondent’s brief,
p. 4.) In any event, substantial evidence does not support the district court’s
finding on this point: that “the exact time” of the alert “cannot be determined.”
(R., pp. 129-30.)

Because the evidence in the record shows that the alert

happened prior to the instruction to “sit tight,” the district court clearly erred in
determining otherwise.
Aberasturi takes several approaches to overcoming the officers’ plain
testimony regarding the timing of the alert. She begins by characterizing the
state’s recitation of facts on this issue, which cites directly to the officers’
testimony above, as “contrary to the district court’s findings.”

(Respondent’s

brief, p. 4.) But that is precisely the state’s point: the officers’ testimony, which is
the only direct evidence on the question, indeed contradicts the district court’s
findings.

The officers gave crystal-clear testimony that the alert happened

before the officer-to-officer notification, and before the conversation with
Aberasturi regarding disorderly conduct concluded. (Tr., p. 43, Ls. 18-25; p. 71,
L. 20 - p. 73, Ls. 18.)

Nevertheless, the district court found it could not

determine when the alert happened. (R., pp. 129-30.) Because the state is
arguing that in light of the evidence, the court clearly erred, it is no surprise that a
statement of fact based on the hearing transcript would be contrary to the district

interest in the window or after he sat and refused to move is unknown,” and that
“there is no indication in the recording by Hoffman that this occurred before the
reason for the stop was concluded.” (R., p. 130 (emphasis added).) Likewise,
the district court found that “[s]omewhere between” the start of Plaisted’s
conversation with Aberasturi and the time of arrest, “Geno alerted to the
presence of narcotics in Defendant’s car,” but “[t]he difficulty for the State is that
the exact time cannot be determined.” (R., pp. 129-30 (emphasis added).)
4

court’s findings. But simply pointing this out does not meaningfully address, let
alone rebut, the state’s argument.
Second, Aberasturi adopts the district court’s finding “that the court is not
confident all of the minor details of the incident are remembered exactly as they
happened or in the order they happened.” (R., p. 130.) Aberasturi takes this
premise to its limit, arguing that “the officers’ testimony was inconsistent and
unreliable,” and concluding that, “as found by the district court, Officer Viens’s
and Officer Hoffman’s[2] testimony provides no guidance on the time of the dog
alert.” (Respondent’s brief, pp. 13-15.)
These

contentions—that the officers’ testimonies are inconsistent and

give “no guidance”—miss the mark. These arguments fail because Aberasturi
has not pointed out any inconsistency in the officers’ testimony regarding the
timing of the alert. (See Respondent’s brief, p. 13 (vaguely alluding to “conflicts
in the officers’ testimony” but not actually stating what those conflicts, if any,
were).) The same can be said of the district court, which supported its finding
with just one example of a “discrepancy”:
For example, Officer Viens testified that his conversation with
Officer Plaisted took place between the time he ran the names and
his conversation with Defendant explaining her need to get
permission from the dumpster owners. Officer Plaisted testified the
conversation took place while Officer Viens was in his patrol
vehicle.
(R., p. 130, n.6.)

2

This appears to be intended to refer to Officer Plaisted. Officer Hoffman did
not testify below. (See Tr.)

5

This example fails to show that the officers’ testimony regarding the alert
was inconsistent, or that the officers were not credible on this point. In fact, this
example only tends to show another erroneous factual finding, because Officer
Viens did not testify that his conversation with Officer Plaisted occurred
sometime between running the information and returning to Aberasturi.

In

actuality, Officer Viens testified that the overheard conversation between Officer
Plaisted and Aberasturi occurred at this time. (Tr., p. 41, L. 9 – p. 42, L.12.)

3

Thus, the court’s single example fails to show that any officer testimony was
inconsistent, let alone show that the crucial testimony regarding the alert was
inconsistent. As a result, to the extent the court made a finding that the officers’
testimony regarding the alert was inconsistent, the evidence in the record does
not support it. The state submits that this Court can itself judge whether the
officers’ testimony was consistent, and further submits that Aberasturi has failed
to show that the decisive testimony on the timing of the alert was inconsistent.

4

3

And note that this account would be entirely consistent with Officer Plaisted’s
recollection: Officer Plaisted testified that when he arrived on scene, he believed
“Officer Viens was sitting in his patrol car doing some kind of records check on
the individuals he was with.” (Tr., p. 67, Ls. 18-20.) While he cautioned that he
could not remember whether he initially spoke to Viens before speaking to
Aberasturi, he nevertheless stated that “Viens was in his patrol car, again, doing
records checks. I pulled [Aberasturi] aside from Hoffman’s car over to Viens’ car.
I briefly spoke to her.” (Tr., p. 68, Ls. 20-23.) Likewise, Officer Viens recalled
that Officer Plaisted arrived when he was in his patrol car running information,
and that the Aberasturi-Plaisted talk happened sometime after Officer Viens
finished running the information, but before he went back to Aberasturi. (Tr., p.
42, Ls. 5-12; p. 52, Ls. 4-11.)

4

Aberasturi takes issue with this Court even reviewing inconsistency findings,
lumping it in with improper invitations to “assess the credibility of witnesses,
resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence and draw factual inferences.”
(Respondent’s brief, p. 13 (citing State v. Hunter, 156 Idaho 568, 570, 328 P.3d
6

Aberasturi appears to argue that because Plaisted notified Viens of the
“specific areas” to be searched, that the officer-to-officer notification must have
been verbal. (See Respondent’s brief, pp. 14-15.) Because no such verbal
notification can be heard on the audio, Aberasturi infers that “the district court
correctly found Officer [Plaisted] made some kind of ‘hand signal or gesture’ to
inform Officer Viens ‘that something was going on with the dog and the vehicle,’”
and that thus, “when Officer Viens told Ms. Aberasturi to ‘sit tight’ a second time,
it was likely only in response to the dog’s ‘head snap’ and ‘bracketing.’”
(Respondent’s brief, pp. 14-15; see also Defense Exhibit 1.) Combining this
assumption with the balance of the testimony, it seems that Aberasturi is arguing
there were two distinct officer-to-officer notifications—one non-verbal, notifying
Viens of the pre-alert activity, and one verbal, notifying Viens of the alert and
where to search. (See Respondent’s brief, pp. 14-15.)
The evidence does not support such a claim. While the district court
drew a reasonable inference that the officer-to-officer notification was done by
hand signal (R., p. 130), that finding does not compel a conclusion that there
was a separate verbal notification, simply because Officer Plaisted “notified
Officer Viens of the alert and specific areas that we needed to search.” (Tr., p.

548, 550 (Ct. App. 2014)).) However, this Court can resolve whether the
testimony was consistent without invading any province of the district court. The
transcript of the testimony is either self-evidently consistent, or it is not. By
definition, judging textual consistency requires no credibility assessment, conflict
resolution, evidence weighing, or other inferential judgment calls. To the extent
the testimony about the alert is consistent on its face, it speaks for itself.
7

72, L. 24 – 73, L. 1.) If one can conclude, as the court reasonably did,5 that a
non-verbal gesture could have notified Officer Viens that the K-9 alerted, one
can also easily imagine the same gesture pointing out where the K-9 alerted. In
any event, the district court did not find that there was more than one notification,
and did not find that the officer-to-officer notification happened after the
instruction to “sit tight”; nor did Officer Plaisted testify that notification was verbal,
or that it came after that instruction. (See R., pp. 129-30; Tr., p. 43, Ls. 18-25; p.
73, Ls. 8-18.) Aberasturi’s challenge to the testimony accordingly fails.
Lastly, Aberasturi suggests that “if any inferences are drawn from the
record, the evidence on the dog sniff supports the opposite finding—that the
police prolonged Ms. Aberasturi’s detention to continue the dog sniff after the
purpose of the stop was fulfilled.” (Respondent’s brief, pp. 15-16.) She argues
that Officer Viens “fulfilled the purpose of the seizure” somewhere around 11:27
to 11:34 in the audio of the stop. (Respondent’s brief, p. 15.) The state submits
that while the audio exhibit is at times difficult to hear, it shows the disorderly
conduct conversation continuing until Officer Viens says “sit tight,” which, based
on the officers’ testimony, would mean the alert necessarily happened before the
conclusion of the warning. (Defense Ex. 1, 08:16-11:36; Tr., p. 43, Ls. 18-25; p.
73, Ls. 8-18.) This only affirms Officer Viens’s testimony that he was notified
about the alert while he was having the disorderly conduct conversation with

5

The court’s “hand signal or gesture” finding (R., p. 130) was a reasonable
inference given the audio. Neither officer testified whether the officer-to-officer
notification was done verbally or by hand signal. (See Tr., p. 43, Ls. 18-25; p. 73,
Ls. 8-18.)

8

Aberasturi.

(Tr., p. 43, Ls. 18-25.)

In sum, the audio does not support

Aberasturi’s contention that the original investigation was prolonged past the
point of the alert.
Because the evidence in the record shows the alert occurred prior to the
continued detention of Aberasturi, this court should find that the district court
clearly erred by concluding the detention was unreasonably extended.
B.

The District Court Erroneously Required The State Show Probable Cause
Before Further Detaining Aberasturi, Where It Only Needed Reasonable
Suspicion
The state submits on appeal that the district court erroneously applied a

probable cause standard in examining whether the detention was proper.
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 15-16.) Aberasturi responds that the court did not do so,
arguing that the state’s own quotations show the district court “plainly required
probable cause for the search,” and not for the seizure. (Respondent’s brief, p.
17.)
While the district court admittedly referred to requiring “probable cause for
the search” (R., p. 130), that does not settle the question. As Aberasturi would
apparently agree, the decisive question on appeal is not whether there was
probable cause for the search—but whether the detention was reasonable.6

6

If the focus was solely on whether probable cause for the search existed, one
could readily find it: the district court specifically found that at the time the K-9
alerted “Officer Plaisted had probable cause to believe there were illegal drugs in
the car.” (R., p. 128.) And it is undisputed on appeal that Aberasturi’s consent
would have allowed for a search of the vehicle. (See Appellant’s brief, p. 17, n.
6.) This does not resolve, however, the relevant question of whether reasonable
9

The district court erred when it concluded “the State failed to meet its
burden of proof that probable cause to search Defendant’s automobile was
developed before the purpose of the investigative stop had been fulfilled.”
(R. p. 130 (emphasis added).) The state submits that whether probable cause
developed before the investigative stop concluded is beside the point; the state
was only required to show that the officers had reasonable suspicion at the time
the original investigation ended. State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d
1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). Because the district court required
a showing of probable cause “before the purpose of the investigative detention
had been fulfilled,” it applied an erroneous legal standard.
C.

The K-9’s Pre-Alert Behavior Provided Reasonable Suspicion Justifying
An Extended Detention
Application of the correct legal standard shows the officers had

reasonable suspicion to further detain Aberasturi even under the facts as found
by the district court. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 16-17.) Thus, even granting the
district court’s suggestion, and Aberasturi’s explicit argument, that the officer-toofficer notification referred to the K-9’s “bracketing behavior,” and not the alert,
the officers would have had reasonable suspicion to further detain Aberasturi.
(See Appellant’s brief, pp. 16-17.)

suspicion existed at the time of the extended detention. To the extent the district
court required anything more than a showing of reasonable suspicion prior to the
extended detention, it erred.
10

Aberasturi disagrees on procedural and substantive grounds. Regarding
the former, she contends that the state’s argument is unsupported and raised for
the first time on appeal.

(Respondent’s brief, pp. 17-18.)

On the merits,

Aberasturi claims that the K-9 showing interest in the vehicle would be
insufficient to provide reasonable suspicion. (R., pp. 19-20.)
Aberasturi’s arguments fail. As a procedural matter, this issue has been
preserved because the district court made a ruling that “the State failed to meet
its burden of proof that probable cause to search Defendant’s automobile was
developed before the purpose of the investigative stop had been fulfilled.” (R., p.
130.) Thus, the district court plainly made “an adverse ruling which forms the
basis for an assignment of error.” State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 378, 384, 987 P.2d
290, 296 (1999) (quoting State v. Fisher, 123 Idaho 481, 485, 849 P.2d 942, 946
(1993)); see also State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 554, 961 P.2d 641, 645 (1998)
(issues actually decided by trial court are subject to appellate review). This issue
was actually decided by the district court, and this Court is not prevented from
reviewing whether the district court erred when it made its ruling.
Moreover, in an appeal from an order granting or denying a motion to
suppress, “this Court is not limited by the prosecutor’s argument or the absence
thereof” below. State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, No. 42730, 2016 WL 3223372, at *5
(Ct. App. June 9, 2016), review granted (Sept. 8, 2016) (citing State v. Newman,
149 Idaho 596, 599, n. 1, 237 P.3d 1222, 1225, n.1 (Ct. App. 2010)). This Court
also freely reviews the application of constitutional principles by the district court.
State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 418, 337 P.3d 575, 577 (2014). The state’s
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arguments below would therefore not limit this Court from applying the correct
legal standard in determining whether reasonable suspicion existed to justify the
extended stop—a central issue preserved for review.
Finally, the state did argue below that reasonable suspicion justified the
detention. “A police officer may stop and detain a person if the officer has a
reasonable and articulable suspicion, based on the totality of the circumstances,
that the person has been or is about to engage in criminal activity.” (R., p. 10607 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873
(1975); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
1968); State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 829 P.2d 520 (1992); State v.
Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 821 P.2d 949 (1991); and State v. Johns, 112 Idaho
873, 736 P.2d 1327 (1987)). The prosecutor also included an entire argument
regarding how the alert by the drug dog provided legal justification to extend the
investigative detention. (R., pp. 111-12.) The record shows that the state did
preserve the issue of whether the extension of the stop was legally justified.
Aberasturi argues that the state raises this issue “for the first time on
appeal,” narrowly framing the issue as “the proposition that a dog ‘showing
interest’ in a vehicle establishes reasonable suspicion.” (Respondent’s brief, p.
18.) However, the district court made its factual finding relating to this argument
(which the state believes is clearly erroneous) only after the arguments were
submitted to it.7 (See R., p. 130 (“Whether [the officer-to-officer notification]

The state notes that Aberasturi likewise made no argument below regarding the
significance of the court’s finding regarding the K-9’s pre-alert behavior, for the
same reason that the finding had not yet been made. Following the hearing
7

12

occurred as Geno was showing interest in the window or after he sat and refused
to move is unknown.”).) Aberasturi has failed to cite to any authority indicating a
party must accurately anticipate a district court’s factual findings and
preemptively address them to preserve an issue for appeal. See State v. Zichko,
129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (“When issues on appeal are not
supported by propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will not be
considered.”)

The state raised the general issue of whether the stop was

unreasonably extended below, and therefore that issue has been preserved.
(See R., pp. 111-12.) Aberasturi’s seeming approach—that parties must not only
predict specific counterfactual findings but painstakingly rebut them before they
are made, or forever waive all sub-claims and articulations of issues on appeal—
is unsupported, illogical, and fails.
Turning to the merits, a continued investigative detention “is permissible if
it is based upon specific articulable facts which justify suspicion that the detained
person is, has been, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.” Sheldon, 139
Idaho at 983, 88 P.3d at 1223 (Ct. App. 2003). Here, Officer Plaisted testified
that he was a certified K-9 handler and that his K-9 was likewise certified to
detect the odors of marijuana, methamphetamine, heroin, and cocaine. (Tr., p.
63, Ls. 21-24; p. 64, Ls. 2-19.) The officer testified that “the alert process is
basically the change of behavior” the K-9 shows, typified by “a lot of head
Aberasturi argued that “[t]he officers violated the Fourth Amendment by seizing
Ms. Aberasturi with no reasonable, articulable suspicion of crime” in the first
place. (R., pp. 99-100.) It does not appear, however, that she ever argued
below that the officer-to-officer notification pertained to the pre-alert behavior, or
was inconclusive. (See R., pp. 63-65, 77-86, 94-102.)

13

snapping, he’ll drool, tail wags. I will see his sniffing increase.” (Tr., p. 65, Ls. 29.) When asked whether “that’s when you know he’s alerted to the odor of
narcotics,” Officer Plaisted first stated that “that’s correct,” and clarified that those
behaviors showed “[w]hen he is going through the alert process, yes.” (Tr., p.
65, Ls. 10-13.) Moreover, he distinguished these pre-alert process indicators
from the ultimate alert itself, stating that “Geno’s final response is when we see a
sit.” (Tr., p. 65, Ls. 14-18.)
Officer Plaisted testified that this very process took place here, prior to the
actual alert, as the K-9 showed interest in the vehicle:
Q. And how do you do that?
A. Simply just take him what I would characterize as a walk around
the car. It’s pretty low key. Then, again, I am just starting to look
for behavior changes in the dog.
Q. And do you have your dog walk around the car immediately after
you had this conversation with the defendant?
A. Yes.
Q. And so when you have your dog walk around the car, what
happens? What do you observe?
A. So, again, I’m just taking Geno for just a casual walk, is what it
is. It wasn’t until we got to the passenger’s side of this vehicle
that that casual walk turned into something more.
I saw Geno do a head snap which is—you know, typically his head
is kind of down facing forward. And all of a sudden it snaps to the
left, which draws my attention. And now he’s beginning to sniff the
odors that are coming out of this car. Geno starts doing what’s
called a bracketing behavior, which he’s sniffing both left to right.
He approaches I believe it was the front passenger door. I saw that
the window on the passenger door was rolled down slightly. Geno
lifts his head up in the air, places his front paws on the door of the
windowsill itself, and he attempted to stretch his body to get his

14

nose closer to the gap in the window to sniff. And then after he did
that, he took his paws off the door and then sat down.
Q. And when he sits down is this—does this indicate something to
you?
A. Yes. So that—going back, that was—that’s his final response.
(Tr., p. 69, L. 21 – p. 71, L. 8 (emphasis added).)
Officer Plaisted’s testimony highlights the articulable facts showing a
reasonable suspicion of drug activity here.

Far from simply showing a dog

“following its handler’s commands,” as Aberasturi dismisses it (Respondent’s
brief, p. 19), the testimony showed the K-9’s behavior evolving from
unremarkable into behavior that typified the alert process. What began as a
casual walk “turned into something more,” drawing the officer’s attention—the K9 was snapping its head, sniffing at odors, bracketing, and even stretching to the
window gap to further smell—all of which preceded the final alert, and which
typified that particular K-9’s pre-alert behavior. (Tr., p. 69, L. 21 – p. 71, L. 8;
see also Tr., p. 65, Ls. 2-13.)

Plainly put, the K-9 was showing the same

physiological responses that the officer testified would precede an alert—and
while pre-alert interest would not have provided probable cause for a search of
the vehicle, it at least would have provided reasonable suspicion of drug use,
such that the officers could have further detained Aberasturi to see if the K-9
ultimately alerted.
Aberasturi claims that if this Court finds reasonable suspicion from the K9’s pre-alert behavior, and the officer-to-officer notification of it, it would abrogate
both Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1615 (2015), and State v.

15

Linze, No. 43960, 2016 WL 6648739 (Nov. 10, 2016). (Respondent’s brief, p.
18-19.)
Not so. Rodriguez applies to cases in which “unrelated inquiries” extend
the duration of an otherwise lawful traffic stop, without reasonable suspicion.
135 S.Ct. at 1615-16. (“An officer, in other words, may conduct certain unrelated
checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop. But … he may not do so in a way
that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to
justify detaining an individual.”) The state’s point in this case is that even if one
grants that the signal from Officer Plaisted referred only to pre-alert behavior,
one cannot escape the fact that the pre-alert behavior showing the K-9’s interest
happened during the original investigation. (Tr., p. 43, Ls. 18-25 (“Q. Okay. And
while you’re having this discussion with her about the disorderly conduct
violation, does Officer Plaisted get your attention? A. Yes.”).) Thus, Rodriguez
does not address the state’s argument that the K-9 showing interest in the
vehicle prior to the end of the stop justified extending it.
By the same logic, Linze is not implicated here, as it concerns the
propriety of a K-9 sniff “when the original purpose of the stop is abandoned.”
2016 WL 6648739, at *3. In Linze, a traffic stop was impermissibly delayed for
two and a half minutes while the investigating officer performed a back-up
function during a drug-dog sweep. Id. at *4. Here, the K-9 sniff happened as the
original investigation unfolded, with no evidence that Officer Viens delayed or
abandoned that investigation prior to receiving notification from Officer Plaisted.
(See Tr., pp. 28-44.) Linze, like Rodriguez, is inapplicable to the issue here.

16

Even if the officer-to-officer notification referred only pre-alert behavior,
this still would have provided reasonable suspicion to further detain Aberasturi.
The district court erred when it found insufficient probable cause developed
before the original investigation concluded; application of the correct,
reasonable-suspicion standard shows the officers were justified in extending the
detention based on the K-9’s pre-alert behavior.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court reverse the district court’s order
granting Aberasturi’s suppression motion and remand this case for further
proceedings.
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